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Abstract We report new findings on bank efficiency in East Asian countries for the pre-
and post-IMF restructuring periods. We find that bank efficiency has improved, but only
to the pre-IMF intervention level, and that restructured banks are not more efficient than
their unrestructured counterparts. Different restructuring measures have different effects.
Bank closures are economically justified, but mergers show short-term efficiency losses.
Recapitalizationand reprivatization ofbadlyperformingbankslead to efficiency improvement,
but also increase government ownership. Ease of entry that has allowed for more foreign bank
participation results in slightly improved performance of badly performing banks.
Keywords EastAsianbankingefficiency.IMF-supportedprograms.Bankrestructuring .
Bankre-privatization .Foreignparticipation
JEL classification G21.G28.C14 .N20
1 Introduction
In this paper, we study effects on bank performance of the IMF programs that support
countries during the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998. We create a sample of 138
commercial banks located in four of the most heavily affected East Asian economies,
Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. We examine the IMF restructuring effects
on bank efficiency over the pre- and post-restructuring years during 1991–2005.
Since the late 1970s, 117 systemic banking crises, which we define as a widespread of
banking failures that affect more than 20% of a banking system’s deposits (Sheng 1996),
have occurred in 93 countries. More than two-thirds of these crises happened in developing
countries (Caprio and Klingebiel 2003). The IMF is charged with safeguarding the stability
of the international monetary system. Thus, the central role for the IMF is to help restore
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e-mail: Mariff@bond.edu.auconfidence in crisis-affected economies by providing a stabilization financial package as a
supported program. One of the main conditions of such programs is that the affected
countries must work with the IMF to undertake a comprehensive financial sector reform.
This cooperation is seen as an integral part of the crisis resolution, with the expectation that
the intervention will lead to performance improvement. Countries that serve as examples of
past interventions include Mexico 1994–1995, the East Asian countries in 1997–1999,
Brazil in 1999, Argentina in 2001, and Turkey in 2001–2002.
A review of the literature on the IMF programs indicates that most studies of crisis
intervention discuss the adoption, implementation, ownership, and impact of those
programs on macroeconomic performance, but do not study the performance of the
affected banking entities (see Joyce 2004). The IMF itself has used the same focus in their
studies. Several studies criticize the IMF-supported programs for not achieving the set
objectives, such as inflation control, mitigation of moral hazard behavior and prevention of
crisis-proneness of systems (see Sen 1998; and Alper and Onis 2002). However, none of
these studies has analyzed the impact that the IMF-supported programs have on the
efficiency of the banks in which the IMF intervened.
There is also a growing number of studies on cross-country banking crises (see Caprio
and Klingebiel 2003; and Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 2005). These studies focus
mainly on describing the causes, consequences, lessons, speed, and shape of general
recovery (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Detagiache 1998; Dell’Ariccia et al. 2005). Some
researchers, such as Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) and Bongini et al. (2001) cite the poor
overall performances of banks, such as poor financial indicators and high inefficiency
scores, as major causes of crises in developing countries. This causal link suggests that
assessing individual bank performance in such developing countries may provide useful
new findings. Yet, the performance of individual banks in developed or developing
countries following crisis management by the IMF has seldom been investigated.
Moreover, although there are several cross-country studies on the effects of such factors
as bank restructuring, deregulation, consolidation, and privatization on bank performance,
these are largely conducted for the U.S. and European economies. Previous studies on the
effects of East Asian bank restructuring on efficiency during1991–2005are still very limited:
only seven studies (see Bongini et al. 2001; Choi and Hasan 2005; Harada 2005; Harada and
Ito 2005; Williams and Nguyen 2005; Park and Weber 2006; and Brown and Skully 2006).
Most such studies either use data prior to the Asian banking crisis or single-year data, and
report mixed results. We fill a gap in the banking literature by using a nonparametric
technique and regression analysis with more recent data that covers a longer period. These
longer-term data make it possible for us to examine technical and scale efficiency (and their
determinants) of the East Asian banks subject to the IMF-supported restructuring programs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the related literature on bank
restructuring and efficiency. In Section 3 we describe our methods. In Section 4 we discuss
the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Review of the literature on bank restructuring and efficiency
A review of the bank restructuring under IMF-supported programs for the four East Asian
countries indicates the use of four main restructuring measures. The first measure involves
closure of banks, that is, insolvent banks are liquidated or integrated with another domestic
bank that is considered to be a sound bank. The second action forces affected banks to
merge with and/or acquired by healthier banks. Another measure involves nationalization
J Financ Serv Res(initial recapitalization by the government with a view to future re-privatization). The fourth
measure calls for private sector involvement in which capital may be sought from private
owners including foreign investors.
Despite abundant literature on bank efficiency, only a handful of previous studies
investigate the link between bank failures (and possibly the closures that followed) and
inefficiency, most of which are on the U.S. banking markets. These studies show that banks
and thrifts with low efficiency fail at greater rates than those with higher efficiency levels
(Berger and Humphrey 1992a; Cebenoyan et al. 1993). Isik and Hassan (2003) provide
evidence from a developing country in their study of Turkish banks during 1992–1996.
These authors suggest that banks experience a substantial productivity loss in the crisis
year, and that the small banks suffer the most. Two studies on East Asian banking
efficiency provide further evidence on this link. Karim (2001) assesses the cost efficiency
of East Asian banks during 1989–1996, and finds that banks’ cost inefficiencies tend to
increase during the years preceding the crisis. Williams and Nguyen (2005), in their
analysis of the profit efficiency and productivity of East Asian banks, show that the closed
banks have significantly lower profit efficiency scores than do other bank types. Hence, the
region’s bank closure decisions could be economically justified.
Previous studies on recapitalization focus on the rationale, techniques, costs, and issues
of recapitalization (see, for example, Tang et al. 2000; Cheung and Liao 2005). Most
recapitalized banks are then reprivatized, and thus become major state banks or fully private
banks in later years. Empirical studies indicate somewhat favorable efficiency effect of bank
privatization, although this conclusion varies across countries (see, for example, extensive
surveys by Megginson 2005, and Clarke et al. 2005). Studies of individual nations that have
gone through economic crisis and/or banking reforms, (e.g., Berger et al. 2005,o nA r g e n t i n a ;
and Bonaccorsi di Patti and Hardy 2005, on Pakistan) find that at least one bank efficiency
measure (cost, profit, or revenue) improves following privatization. The empirical evidence
on bank privatization in the East Asian banking markets is very limited and inconclusive.
Williams and Nguyen (2005) find that East Asian state-owned banks underperform private
and foreign-owned banks, and that privatized banks improve efficiency after privatization. In
contrast, Harada and Ito (2005), in their study of the top ten Indonesian banks, find no
evidence of such a privatization effect on bank efficiency over the period 1999–2003.
The results on the impact of bank mergers and acquisitions (M&As) on the efficiency of
the merged banks are again mainly from the U.S. and European banking markets. Two
extensive surveys by Berger et al. (1999) and Amel et al. (2004) show that banking M&As
do not significantly improve cost and profit efficiency. The empirical evidence from East
Asian banking M&As is again very limited and inconclusive. The only cross-country study
(Williams and Nguyen 2005) reports mixed results of the M&A effects on profit and cost
efficiency. These authors report that domestic M&As gain significant short-term profit
efficiency gains, but experience long-term profit efficiency losses, a result exactly the
opposite for cost efficiency. Harada (2005) documents that efficiency of Korean banks
deteriorated before crisis, but improved following the mergers.
Previous studies on the association between foreign ownership and efficiency provides
somewhat mixed results. But overall, there is greater evidence to support the proposition
that foreign-owned banks are generally more efficient than their domestic counterparts (see,
for example, Claessens et al. 2001; Weill 2003; Berger 2007). However, there is very
limited evidence on the effects of foreign acquisitions (participation) on bank efficiency,
and again, the results are mixed. Fries and Taci (2005) claim that majority-foreign-owned
banks in transition economies are the most efficient, Berger et al. (2005) report efficiency
declines associated with foreign acquisitions of Argentine banks.
J Financ Serv ResAlthough the previous evidence on the relation between foreign ownership and bank
efficiency in the East Asian banking markets is limited, it is in line with other studies that
report some favorable results for foreign ownership. Laeven (1999) finds that foreign banks
in the region took little risk relative to other bank types in the pre-crisis period. Studies by
Karim (2001) and Williams and Nguyen (2005) show that both domestic and foreign-
owned private banks are more efficient than are state-owned banks. Other studies (Harada
2005; Choi and Hasan 2005) find that higher foreign ownership is associated with higher
efficiency. Thus, such banks outperform other bank types. In addition, financial
liberalization, which includes foreign bank entry following deregulation, has positive
effects on domestic bank efficiency (Leightner and Lovell 1998; Park and Weber 2006).
There is limited evidence on the effects of foreign participation on the East Asian banking
efficiency. The only study (Williams and Nguyen 2005) shows that the potential benefits of
foreign participation may take a longer time to be realized.
Thus, theinternationalempiricalevidenceonbankfailuresandefficiencygenerallysupports
bank closure (liquidation) decisions. Further, although the evidence on the impact of bank
privatization, M&As, and foreign participation is somewhat mixed, there are some favorable
results ofimproved performance for privatization andforeignownership or participation. Inthe
absence of guidance from previous evidence and with the expectation that East Asian banking
efficiency will improve after the IMF restructuring, we formulate hypothesis 1:
H1: After controlling for country-specific characteristics, we will find that the East Asian
banks’ technical and scale efficiencies significantly improve after restructuring under
IMF-supported programs.
As noted above, there is the expectation of improvement after restructuring. The
restructured banks may catch up with their unrestructured counterparts in terms of
efficiency after controlling for other bank-specific and country-specific characteristics. This
argument leads to our second hypothesis.
H2: After controlling for other bank- and country-specific characteristics, we will find
that there is no significant difference in technical and scale efficiencies between the
East Asian restructured banks and their un-restructured counterparts.
There is no previous evidence of how recapitalization affects performance. Above, we
noted the mixed results on performance from mergers and acquisitions, and favorable
results for foreign participation. These arguments lead to our third and fourth hypotheses.
H3: After controlling for other bank- and country-specific characteristics, we will find
that there is no significant difference in technical and scale efficiencies of the East
Asian banks before and after recapitalization and mergers.
H4: After controlling for other bank- and country-specific characteristics, we will find
that the technical and scale efficiencies of the East Asian banks with foreign
participation significantly improve after restructuring.
3 Data and method
Our sample comprises 138 domestic commercial banks operating in the four crisis-hit East
Asian countries that accepted IMF-supported programs. The data set covers the 15 years
J Financ Serv Resbetween 1991 and 2005. To ensure homogeneity, we exclude banks such as development
(specialized), investment, savings, regional rural, and joint-venture banks, and wholly-
owned subsidiaries and branches of foreign banks, and thus ensure the comparability of the
results inside and outside the sample.
Our primary source for the bank-specific data is the Bankscope database. We obtain the
country-specific data from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF. Other
sources include the World Bank, the four central bank reports, Heritage Foundation, and the
Wall Street Journal. These sources enable us to use annual cross-section, time-series and
pooled financial data.
Of the 138 banks in the final sample, there are 66 Indonesian, 26 Korean, 32 Filipino,
and 14 Thai banks. These banks account for a representative asset coverage in each of the
four banking markets, ranging from a minimum of 68% in Korea to a maximum of 82% in
Indonesia. Most banks are privately owned (91% of the sample), and state-owned banks
account for 9%. There are 74 banks that are listed on the stock market (54%) and 64 that
are not (46%). Table 1 provides summary statistics on the data.
When we examine restructuring measures, we find that only 30% of the banks did not
experience any dramatic changes, since the restructuring agency and the IMF judged these
banks as being sound enough to continue without interventions. The majority of banks (70%)
underwent some form of restructuring: closure; merger and/or acquisition; recapitalization
and then reprivatization; or foreign participation. Among the 97 restructured banks, 54 banks
were closed (liquidated or forced to be taken over by another bank), 22 banks underwent
mergers or acquisitions to continue operations, and the other 21 banks were recapitalized by
the respective governments. Nine out of these 21 recapitalized banks were later reprivatized
to both domestic and foreign investors. In addition, both the restructured and 44 unrestructured
banks had foreign bank participation in the form of acquisitions or equity capital contributions,
andthusbecamemajority-orminority-ownedbyforeignbanks.Ourcompleteresearchdataset,
which contains 1,326 bank-year observations over the test period, is available on request.
Firm-specific efficiency scores can be calculated using either parametric or nonpara-
metric methods, and each method has its own merits and drawbacks. In this paper, we use
the nonparametric method for several reasons. First, the nonparametric methods such as
Table 1 Summary statistics of the sample banks. This table reports the summary statistics of the sample
banks by ownership, listing status and restructuring measures. It also reports the representation of the banks
in each country’s banking sector
Indonesia Korea Philippines Thailand Total
No. of banks 66 26 32 14 138
Ownership State-owned 5 2 2 4 13
Private-owned 61 24 30 10 125
Listing Listed 24 21 21 8 74
Unlisted 42 5 11 6 64
Restructuring Unrestructured 21 3 17 0 41
Restructured 45 23 15 14 97
Of restructured banks Closed 29 14 8 3 54
M&A 4 5 6 7 2 2
Recapitalized 12 4 1 4 21
Of restructured banks Re-privatized 6 0 0 3 9
Foreign-participated 12 8 14 10 44
Share of assets (%) 82 68 77 75
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the parametric methods are normally limited to focusing on a single dependent variable,
such as cost, revenue, or profits (Avkiran 2002). Second, price information is generally
regarded as being necessary for inputs/outputs in the parametric techniques. These prices
may be distorted due to regulations and other market imperfections in developing countries,
and therefore may complicate the efficiency measurement (Ataullah et al. 2004). The
nonparametric methods can be used for efficiency assessment without this price
information.
Another reason is that, as Cooper et al. (2000) describe, in the nonparametric DEA,
measurement units of different inputs and outputs do not need to be congruent, so stock
and flow variables can be dealt with in the same model. Thus, DEA can address both
quantitative and qualitative data, and discretionary and non-discretionary variables. This
consideration is important in cross-country studies such as ours, which incorporates
country-banking environmental variables. Further, the nonparametric approaches also
provide meaningful scalar technical efficiency and scale efficiency measures (Favero and
Papi 1995). Finally, most studies have already used parametric methods to examine the
efficiency of East Asian banks. Therefore, it is pertinent to see whether the DEA-based
efficiency scores, which we consider in our unique IMF-supported cases, can support the
conclusions reached by other studies.
DEA models commonly have either an input or output orientation. For this study, we
choose the input-oriented modeling since, from the bank management perspective; it is
easier to have control over inputs than outputs. The DEA model can be tested under either
constant returns to scale (CRS) or variable returns to scale (VRS) assumptions. In this
paper, we investigate both CRS and VRS assumptions from which we can identify scale
efficiencies. Following Coelli et al. (2005), we use the following input-oriented CRS DEA
specification, which incorporates environmental variables. (We note that we suppress the
time subscript in the equation):
subjectto
Minq;lq;
 yi þ Yl   0
qxi   Xl   0
zi   Zl   0
l   0
ð1Þ
In Eq. 1 we assume that there are K inputs and M outputs for each of N firms. For firm i,
these vectors are represented by xi and yi respectively. The (K × N) input matrix, X, and the
(M × N) output matrix, Y, represent the data of all N firms. We also assume that there are L
environmental variables. These vectors are represented by zi for firm i and by (L × N)
matrix Z for N firms. Parameter θ is a scalar, and l is a (N × 1) vector of constants. The
value of θ is the efficiency score of firm i. It satisfies θ ≤ 1, with a value of one indicating a
point on the frontier, and hence a technically efficient firm.
For the scale assumptions, Eq. 1 represents the CRS DEA model. The VRS DEA model
is generated by Eq. 1 plus the convexity constraint (N1′l = 1). We can calculate the scale
efficiency (SE) by comparing the differences in technical efficiency (TE) scores generated
by the CRS and VRS DEA models. If there is a difference in the two efficiency scores, then
this difference indicates the existence of scale inefficiency. Following Coelli (1996b), we





J Financ Serv Reswhere SEi is the scale efficiency, TEi,crs is the technical efficiency score under CRS, and
TEi,vrs is the technical efficiency score under VRS assumptions.
There are two competing theories of banking service provision: the production and the
intermediation approaches. Under the production approach, banks are regarded as using
labor and capital to produce deposits and loans. The intermediation approach views banks
as intermediaries that use loans and other earning assets as outputs, and capital, labor, and
deposits as inputs (Sealey and Lindley 1977). Following Isik and Hassan (2003), and Casu
et al. (2004), we use the intermediation approach. To capture the most significant banking
activities, we use three inputs (purchased funds, labor and physical capital) and two outputs
(loans and other earning assets) in Eq. 1.
In addition, since DEA is very sensitive to outliers (Hartman et al. 2001; Hughes and
Yaisawarng 2004), we run an input-oriented CRS super-efficiency model for each annual
data set to identify any units as outliers. Following Hartman et al. (2001), we use two as our
cut-off point. As a result, we remove one bank that we identified as an outlier in all years.
Three other banks that were outliers in 2 or 3 years were removed from the sample for only
those years.
Recent cross-country studies stress the importance of controlling for country-specific
environmental conditions (see, for instance, Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas 2000; Lozano-Vivas
et al. 2002; Carbo-Valverde et al. 2007; Psiouras 2008). Following these recent develop-
ments, we introduce country-specific variables directly into the DEA efficiency model.
Based on the variables identified in similar studies (for instance, Dietsch and Lozano-
Vivas 2000; Lozano-Vivas et al. 2002), we initially select ten environmental variables,
which we categorize into two main groups. The first group, which we label “main
conditions,” comprises measures of population density, density of demand, income per
capita, interest rate level, inflation rate, and overall economic condition. The second group,
which we label “banking and financial conditions,” consists of degree of concentration,
depth of bank intermediation, degree of monetization, and degree of regulatory restrictions.
In addition, given that the choice of restructuring measures should depend on the level of
difficulties that each banking system faces, we also consider a fifth variable as a proxy
of asset quality. These variables characterize the structure, competition, and critical problem
of a banking industry. Data limitations prevent us from investigating the impact of political
connections on the implementation of the restructuring measures, which may in turn
influence banking efficiency during the study period.
Once we identify the eleven environmental variables, we follow the forward selection
procedure (see Lozano-Vivas et al. 2002). This approach helps to minimize the number of
variables incorporated into the DEA model by statistically selecting only those influential
environmental variables. We find that five out of eleven environmental variables are
influential. Thus, we include the following variables: degree of monetization, density of
demand, population density, overall economic condition, and average asset quality. Following
Lozano-Vivas et al. (2002), we consider that the first four variables are the output type, i.e.,
the higher, the better; and therefore should be introduced as inputs in the DEA model. The
fifth variable, average asset quality measured by non-performing loans (NPLs) to total loans,
is an input-type variable, i.e., the lower, the better. Thus, we should include this variable as an
output, or else transform it into a non-discretionary input by reversing its sign and translating
it. We opt for the latter solution, so that we use all five environmental variables as inputs in
the DEA model. The complete model has ten variables: three inputs, two outputs, and five
environmental variables. We define these variables in Table 2.
The Zhu (2003) DEA-Solver software allows for a single-step calculation of the
technical and then scales efficiency scores under this complete model. We use these
J Financ Serv ResTable 2 Variable definitions (Eqs. 1 and 3). This table defines the variables used in the DEA and regression





Purchased funds Customer deposits, money market funding & other funds
Labor Personnel expenses
Physical capital Book value of fixed assets
Panel B: outputs
Net loans Total customer loans minus loan loss reserves
Other earning
assets
Placements with other banks, securities and investments
Panel C: environmental variables
Degree of
monetization
Broad money (M2) divided by GDP (%)
Density of demand Total deposits of banking sector divided by area (km
2)




GDP growth rate (%)
Average asset
quality
Total non-performing loans to total loans
Panel D: Tobit regression variables
θ Efficiency scores of banks (dependent variable)
β0 Constant
RESTR A dummy variable for restructured banks during 1998–2002 +/−
CLOSED A dummy variable for closed banks during 1998–2002 −
RECAP A dummy variable for recapitalized banks during 1998–2002 +/−
RECAP_EFF A dummy variable for the years following the recapitalization +/−
REPRIV A dummy for recapitalized banks which were later reprivatized during
1998–2002
+/−
M&A A dummy variable for a domestic bank that underwent at least one
domestic merger or acquisition during 1998–2002
+/−
M&A_EFF A dummy variable for the years following the M or A +/−
FOR A dummy variable for a bank that underwent at least one foreign
acquisition or participation during 1998–2002
+
FOR_EFF A dummy variable for the years following foreign acquisition or
participation during 1998–2002
+
DUR_IMF A dummy variable for the years during IMF program (1998–2000) +/−
POST_IMF A dummy variable for the years following IMF program +/−
STATE A dummy variable for state-owned banks during 1991–2005 −
LISTED A dummy variable for listed banks during 1991–2005 +/−
LnASSETS Natural logarithm of total assets +/−
ETA Total equity to total assets +
LTA Gross loans to total assets
LLRL Loan loss reserves to total loans −
CTI Cost to income −
NIITI Non-interest income to total income +
ROA Profits before tax to total assets +
LATA Liquid assets to total assets +/−
LTD Gross loans to total deposits and money market funding +/−
INDO, KOR,
PHIL
A dummy for Indonesia, Korea, and Philippines, respectively
ɛ Error term
J Financ Serv Resefficiency scores in the regression model to identify determinants of bank efficiency. Other
studies use alternative regression methods, including ordinary least squares (OLS),
generalized least squares (GLS), logistic, and Tobit regressions for this purpose. We use
the Tobit censored regression because it can account for the censored nature of the
dependent variable, that is, the efficiency scores, thus yielding reportedly consistent
estimates. To control for heteroskedasticity, and following Isik and Hassan (2003), we also
use GLS regressions with White’s( 1980) corrections. We regress the efficiency scores
against restructuring measures and other bank-specific characteristics under the following
Tobit regression model:
qijt ¼ b0 þ b1RESTRijt þ b2CLOSEDijt þ b3RECAPijt þ b4RECAP EFFijt þ b5REPRIVijt
þb6M&Aijt þ b7M&A EFFijt þ b8FORijt þ b9FOR EFFijt þ b10DUR IMFt
þb11POST IMFt þ b12STATEijt þ b13LISTEDijt þ b14 lnASSETSijt þ b15ETAijt þ b16LTAijt
þb17LLRLijt þ b18TCTAijt þ b19CTIijt þ b20NIITIijt þ b21ROAijt þ b22LATAijt þ b23LTDijt
þb24INDOj þ b25KORj þ b26PHILj þ "ijt
ð3Þ
In Eq. 3, we define subscripts i as individual banks, j countries, t time horizon, and other
variables with the expected signs, as in Table 2, Panel D.
We choose 1998–2002, i.e., the 2years after the IMF programs, to consistently define the
variables that indicate the four restructuring measures (closure, recapitalization, M&As, and
foreign participation). We do so because first, although a majority of banks underwent at
least one of the four restructuring measures during 1998–2000, several banks were
recapitalized, consolidated, or reprivatized in 2002; and second, because a 3-year horizon
after that final restructuring year should be sufficient for assessing such restructuring
measures in their post-event period.
Table 3 reports the average values of the variables disaggregated by country. There are
significant variations in the banking variables among the four countries. Korean banks
appear to dominate in all banking inputs and outputs, followed by Thai banks. The Filipino
banks have the smallest values in these variables. For example, with respect to inputs, the
average purchased funds vary from US$1.8 billion in the Philippines to US$20 billion in
Korea. On the outputs, while Indonesian banks provide US$2.4 billion of loans annually,
this figure for Thai banks is US$8.8 billion (see Panel A).
When we examine the environmental variables, we find that Korea is the most
monetized economy, with a value of 109% for the ratio of broad money supply to GDP (as
in Panel B). As measured by total banking deposits over area, Korea also has the highest
average density of demand, followed by Thailand, and then the Philippines. In addition,
Korea also has the highest period-average GDP growth rate (5.6% per year). Banks in
Indonesia and Thailand suffer the highest level of difficulties with higher nonperforming
loan ratios, and Korean banks face the lowest (Panel B).
4 Discussion of results
We now turn to discuss the results on technical and scale efficiencies obtained from the
DEA model, and determinants of efficiency from the regression.
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Table 4 reports the average values of the computed technical efficiency scores of all the
sample banks, under a common efficiency frontier.
Our preliminary observation shows that an average efficiency score is 0.836 under the
basic model and 0.920 under the complete model. This result indicates that the banks
experience an inefficiency level of 16% (or 8% under the complete model) relative to the
best-practice (fully efficient) bank during 1991–2005 (final row in Table 4). In other words,
the average input-oriented efficiency level of 0.836 suggests that the East Asian banks
could reduce inputs by 16% without affecting outputs (on an assumption of zero slacks).
A second observation is that when we do not control for environmental differences
(basic model), we see that the average efficiency of the sample banks decreases by 8% from
0.855 before the IMF program to 0.776 during the IMF program, and then recovers to 0.846
after the IMF program (Table 4, column 2). When we control for environmental differences
(complete model), the average efficiency appears to be more stable, with the result showing
a slight decline (−2%) during the IMF program, then a rise of 4% in the post-IMF period
(Table 4, column 4). These scores suggest that the negative impact of the Asian financial
crisis on bank efficiency was felt deeply during the crisis.
The results also indicate that on average, the mean efficiency scores under the complete
model are 8.4% higher than those of the basic model (final row in Table 4). This finding is
supported by the empirical evidence (e.g., Chaffai et al. 2001; Lozano-Vivas et al. 2002;
Table 3 Banking and environmental variables by country (1991–2005). This table presents the mean values
and standard deviations (over 1991–2005) of selected banking and environmental variables that we use for
the efficiency assessment model. We convert all financial variables into United States dollar (US$) values,
using average annual exchange rates for each year, and then adjust for inflationary effects, using each
country’s gross domestic product deflator (GDPD)
Indonesia Korea Philippines Thailand
Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev
Panel A: banking variables (US$ million)
Purchased funds 3,686.1 7,065.3 20,103.4 23,485.1 1,842.2 2,014.45 10,718.5 9,308.58
Labor expense 47.73 88.87 218.44 239.87 31.85 35.04 90.34 86.69
Fixed assets 74.48 130.8 580.22 532.94 76.92 104.48 403.85 360.75
Net loans 2,437.6 5,213.9 14,769.8 18,502.4 1,220.8 1,309.07 8,823.7 8,109.39
Other earning
assets
1,268.4 2,815.5 7,166.2 6,980.6 852.18 899.09 2,189.3 2,758.28
Panel B: selected environmental variables
Broad money to
GDP (%)










106.69 5.96 462.99 15.66 242.60 21.74 116.93 5.18
GDP growth
rate (%)
3.94 5.74 5.63 4.07 3.76 2.09 4.70 5.15
NPLs to total
loans (%)
13.77 14.43 6.23 4.19 9.16 4.95 14.67 11.25
J Financ Serv ResKasman et al. 2005) on cross-country banking efficiency, that country-specific environ-
mental conditions exercise remarkable influence on bank efficiency. However, our results
show narrower dispersions (standard deviations) of efficiency scores under both models
(9% compared to 20% to 25% in other studies), suggesting that our sample might be more
homogeneous than samples in other studies. In addition, our control of the fifth environmental
variable (asset quality) raises the average efficiency score by 2.7%, suggesting that it is
important to consider the level of difficulties that each banking system faces, particularly in a
period of financial turmoil (also, see Berger and DeYoung 1997).
To investigate the varied impacts of the IMF-supported programs on bank efficiency, in
Table 5 we disaggregate the computed efficiency scores by country. The statistics show that
whether or not we control for environmental differences, Thai banks, on average, are the
most efficient, followed by the Filipino banks. On the other hand, the results from both
models suggest that the Indonesian banks are the least efficient.
The results in Panel A (basic model), also show that average efficiency decreases during
the crisis period (thus, during the IMF program). Indonesian banks are the most affected by
the crisis, experiencing a reduction of 17% in their average efficiency scores, followed by
Thai banks (6%), and Korean banks (4%). The Filipino banks, being less affected by the
crisis, are able to maintain their pre-IMF efficiency level of 0.85 (Panel A, Column 3). In
the post-IMF period, banks (excepting those in the Philippines) regain efficiency to their
pre-IMF level. Korean banks even obtain their efficiency of 0.895, or 9.5% higher than that
prior to the IMF program.
Table 4 Technical efficiency scores: basic and complete models. This table presents the mean, standard
deviation, and count of the sample banks’ technical efficiency scores, which we obtain from the DEA input-
oriented model under the CRS assumption. The basic model uses three inputs (purchased funds, labor costs,
and physical capital), and two outputs (net loans and other earning assets). The complete model uses the
same inputs and outputs, but also incorporates five environmental variables (deposit density, degree of
monetization, population density, overall economic condition, and asset quality)
Basic model (without environmental variables) Complete model (with environmental variables)
Year Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation No. of observations
1991 0.886 0.089 0.952 0.055 44
1992 0.873 0.076 0.933 0.073 78
1993 0.881 0.078 0.925 0.071 102
1994 0.858 0.088 0.885 0.082 114
1995 0.854 0.090 0.888 0.094 119
1996 0.797 0.127 0.925 0.088 120
1997 0.836 0.097 0.923 0.087 111
Pre-IMF 0.855 0.092 0.919 0.078 98
1998 0.784 0.152 0.900 0.110 94
1999 0.798 0.156 0.904 0.101 90
2000 0.746 0.162 0.894 0.145 87
Dur-IMF 0.776 0.157 0.899 0.119 90
2001 0.829 0.118 0.939 0.100 83
2002 0.808 0.123 0.939 0.101 81
2003 0.875 0.096 0.937 0.078 76
2004 0.853 0.096 0.945 0.075 72
2005 0.864 0.093 0.952 0.061 55
Post-IMF 0.846 0.105 0.942 0.083 73
All-year 0.836 0.118 0.920 0.088 88
J Financ Serv ResWhen we consider the environmental variables, we find a similar trend for the banks in
Indonesia, Thailand, and Korea, which have efficiency reductions of 6%, 2%, and 1.5%,
respectively. The efficiency of Filipino banks actually rises by 1.5% during the IMF
program (Panel B, Complete Model). Thus, we see that the environmental conditions
Table 5 Technical efficiency scores by country. This table presents the mean and standard deviation of the
sample banks’ technical efficiency scores by country. We obtain the efficiency scores from the DEA input-
oriented model under the CRS assumption (Eq. 1). The basic model uses three inputs (purchased funds, labor
costs, and physical capital), and two outputs (net loans and other earning assets). The complete model uses
the same inputs and outputs, but also incorporates five environmental variables (deposit density, degree of
monetization, population density, overall economic condition, and asset quality)
Year Indonesia Korea Philippines Thailand All-country
Panel A: basic model (without environmental variables)
1991 0.861 0.879 0.838 0.930 0.886
1992 0.865 0.825 0.863 0.928 0.873
1993 0.883 0.826 0.876 0.891 0.881
1994 0.877 0.789 0.844 0.911 0.858
1995 0.868 0.783 0.855 0.907 0.854
1996 0.793 0.723 0.810 0.890 0.797
1997 0.835 0.780 0.857 0.876 0.836
Pre-IMF 0.855 0.801 0.849 0.905 0.855
1998 0.672 0.745 0.883 0.890 0.784
1999 0.683 0.801 0.876 0.851 0.798
2000 0.693 0.754 0.788 0.799 0.746
Dur-IMF 0.683 0.767 0.849 0.847 0.776
2001 0.809 0.857 0.826 0.847 0.829
2002 0.767 0.886 0.810 0.833 0.808
2003 0.864 0.921 0.854 0.876 0.875
2004 0.846 0.893 0.825 0.863 0.853
2005 0.821 0.915 0.842 0.891 0.864
Post-IMF 0.822 0.895 0.831 0.862 0.846
All-year 0.809 0.825 0.843 0.879 0.836
Panel B: complete model (with environmental variables)
1991 0.926 0.972 0.946 0.962 0.952
1992 0.928 0.893 0.940 0.970 0.933
1993 0.914 0.880 0.944 0.962 0.925
1994 0.904 0.841 0.866 0.929 0.885
1995 0.915 0.822 0.887 0.930 0.888
1996 0.904 0.925 0.913 0.960 0.925
1997 0.897 0.899 0.931 0.963 0.923
Pre-IMF 0.912 0.891 0.918 0.954 0.919
1998 0.844 0.893 0.940 0.923 0.900
1999 0.874 0.849 0.934 0.958 0.904
2000 0.841 0.883 0.925 0.928 0.894
Dur-IMF 0.853 0.875 0.933 0.936 0.899
2001 0.905 0.945 0.952 0.945 0.939
2002 0.898 0.967 0.941 0.939 0.939
2003 0.903 0.977 0.926 0.929 0.937
2004 0.910 0.983 0.918 0.958 0.945
2005 0.952 0.978 0.908 0.958 0.952
Post-IMF 0.913 0.970 0.929 0.946 0.942
All-year 0.893 0.912 0.917 0.945 0.920
J Financ Serv Resexercise either positive or negative effects on bank efficiency, at least during the crisis
period. In the post-IMF period, we see that while Indonesian banks are able to raise their
average efficiency and almost regain efficiency to their pre-IMF level, Korean banks make
a remarkable 10% gain, surpassing their pre-IMF level. The Filipino banks’ efficiency
deteriorates slightly. We find a very slight improvement in efficiency for Thai banks in the
post-IMF period, but it is still 1% lower than that in the pre-IMF period.
4.2 Scale efficiency (SE)
We calculate SE by comparing the differences in TE scores generated under the CRS and
VRS specifications. Table 6 summarizes the SE of the sample banks under both the basic
and complete models.
The banks’ period average SE is 0.892 for the basic model and 0.925 for the complete
model. This result suggests that on average, and assuming zero slacks, the banks deviate
11% (basic model) or 7.5% (complete model) from their potential efficiency score. Since
the overall efficiency depends on both technical efficiency and scale efficiency, the relative
sizes of these scores provide us with evidence about the sources of inefficiency. When we
ignore environmental factors, then the overall period-mean TE score (0.836) is about 6%
below the period-mean SE (0.892), suggesting that the technical factor is a relatively more
important inefficiency source than the scale factor. However, when we include the
Table 6 Scale efficiency scores: basic and complete models. This table presents the mean, standard
deviation, and count of the sample banks’ scale efficiency scores, which we obtain from the calculations of
the differences between the scores under the constant returns to scale (CRS) and those under the variable
returns to scale (VRS) assumptions (Eq. 2). The basic model uses three inputs (purchased funds, labor costs,
and physical capital), and two outputs (net loans and other earning assets). The complete model uses the
same inputs and outputs, but also incorporates five environmental variables (deposit density, degree of
monetization, population density, overall economic condition, and asset quality)
Basic model (without environmental variables) Complete model (with environmental variables)
Year Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation No. of observations
1991 0.908 0.061 0.948 0.060 44
1992 0.926 0.042 0.943 0.063 78
1993 0.934 0.037 0.940 0.060 102
1994 0.936 0.033 0.917 0.070 114
1995 0.940 0.031 0.924 0.075 119
1996 0.859 0.092 0.917 0.088 120
1997 0.918 0.063 0.936 0.079 111
Pre-IMF 0.917 0.051 0.932 0.071 98
1998 0.860 0.097 0.911 0.115 94
1999 0.863 0.092 0.922 0.094 90
2000 0.811 0.114 0.906 0.151 87
Dur-IMF 0.845 0.101 0.913 0.120 90
2001 0.868 0.077 0.936 0.106 83
2002 0.855 0.097 0.929 0.107 81
2003 0.903 0.059 0.917 0.079 76
2004 0.891 0.065 0.930 0.071 72
2005 0.904 0.060 0.937 0.066 55
Post-IMF 0.884 0.071 0.930 0.086 73
All-year 0.892 0.068 0.925 0.087 88
J Financ Serv Resenvironmental variables, the difference in efficiency between the technical factor and scale
factor is no longer present (Tables 4 and 6, final rows).
However, with this SE specification, it is not clear whether the banks are operating in an
area of increasing or decreasing returns to scale. To determine this and following Coelli
(1996b), we run an additional DEA test with non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS)
imposed, and compare these NIRS scores with those under the VRS assumption. On
average, the results from these tests are all different. This finding suggests that most banks
are operating in the region of increasing returns to scale. One implication is that the banks
might achieve significant cost savings and efficiency gains by increasing their scale of
operations, which they might be able to do via internal growth or continued consolidation
in the sector. Consolidation exercises that take place after the crisis could thus be justified
based on this SE analysis.
Table 7 reports the SE scores by country. When we do not consider environmental
differences, we find that on average, the Thai banks are the most scale efficient (0.925) and
Indonesian banks the least (0.876). Although the SE of Korean banks declines slightly over
time, it still surpasses that of Thai banks when we take the environmental factors into
account. Although the SE of the banks in Indonesia and the Philippines are slightly higher
(2%) under the complete model, the SE of Indonesian banks is the lowest (0.88–0.9),
whether or not we consider environmental factors.
When we consider changes in efficiency by period, the results under the basic model
indicate that the average SE of all sample banks decreases by 7% (from 0.917 to 0.845)
during the IMF program. However, these banks (except for those in the Philippines) could
almost reach their pre-IMF level in the post-IMF period. The SE of the Filipino banks, on
the other hand, is 4% lower than that in the pre-IMF period. But when we control for
environmental differences, although the SE of Thai banks declines by 2% during the IMF
program, it remains unchanged in the post-IMF period. The SE of Indonesian banks
decreases the most, by 7%, during the IMF program, and then recovers to the pre-IMF level
in the post-IMF period. The SE of Korean banks declines slightly over time, but that of
Filipino banks increases during the IMF program, after which it declines in the post-IMF
period, ending at the same level as their pre-IMF positions (Table 7, Panel B).
4.3 Determinants of bank efficiency
Due to the censored nature of the efficiency scores, we use the Tobit censored regression.
We also run GLS multiple regressions as robustness tests. Following Baltagi (2005), we
conduct tests for identifying multicollinearity (the Variance Inflation Factor test) and
autocorrelation (the Durbin–Watson test). The test results enable us to confirm the
normality of the data set. Since the results from the Tobit and GLS regressions are similar,
with the majority of the coefficients being statistically significant and the coefficients
having the same sign, we report on and discuss only the pooled Tobit regression results.
These results serve as robustness tests of the previous discussion.
4.3.1 Bank restructuring and efficiency
The effects of the bank restructuring measures on efficiency are expressed by the estimated
coefficients in Table 8, Panel A. To capture the overall effect of the IMF-supported bank
restructuring programs, we use a dummy, Restructured, for determining if the restructured
banks outperform their non-restructured counterparts. The reported positive but nonsignif-
icant coefficient indicates that the restructured banks are not significantly more efficient
J Financ Serv ResTable 7 Scale efficiency scores by country. This table presents the mean and standard deviation of the
sample banks’ scale efficiency scores by country. We obtain the efficiency scores from the calculations of the
differences between the scores under the constant returns to scale (CRS) and those under the variable returns
to scale (VRS) assumptions (Eq. 2). The basic model uses three inputs (purchased funds, labor costs, and
physical capital), and two outputs (net loans and other earning assets). The complete model uses the same
inputs and outputs, but also incorporates five environmental variables (deposit density, degree of
monetization, population density, overall economic condition, and asset quality)
Year Indonesia Korea Philippines Thailand All-country
Panel A: basic model (without environmental variables)
1991 0.913 0.878 0.897 0.936 0.908
1992 0.912 0.909 0.926 0.949 0.926
1993 0.928 0.914 0.933 0.949 0.934
1994 0.930 0.928 0.934 0.934 0.936
1995 0.933 0.935 0.941 0.927 0.940
1996 0.886 0.853 0.843 0.922 0.859
1997 0.912 0.895 0.924 0.929 0.918
Pre-IMF 0.916 0.902 0.914 0.935 0.917
1998 0.826 0.801 0.889 0.925 0.860
1999 0.812 0.855 0.887 0.929 0.863
2000 0.787 0.780 0.822 0.857 0.811
Dur-IMF 0.808 0.812 0.866 0.904 0.845
2001 0.857 0.878 0.844 0.904 0.868
2002 0.816 0.893 0.848 0.910 0.855
2003 0.879 0.917 0.893 0.937 0.903
2004 0.878 0.887 0.882 0.918 0.891
2005 0.869 0.922 0.896 0.940 0.904
Post-IMF 0.860 0.899 0.873 0.922 0.884
All-year 0.876 0.883 0.891 0.925 0.892
Panel B: complete model (with environmental variables)
1991 0.951 0.961 0.925 0.957 0.948
1992 0.933 0.955 0.919 0.964 0.943
1993 0.919 0.956 0.923 0.964 0.940
1994 0.909 0.959 0.845 0.955 0.917
1995 0.920 0.955 0.866 0.954 0.924
1996 0.909 0.921 0.892 0.945 0.917
1997 0.902 0.946 0.947 0.948 0.936
Pre-IMF 0.920 0.950 0.902 0.955 0.932
1998 0.839 0.953 0.915 0.936 0.911
1999 0.869 0.946 0.928 0.943 0.922
2000 0.836 0.944 0.924 0.923 0.906
Dur-IMF 0.848 0.948 0.922 0.934 0.913
2001 0.910 0.964 0.942 0.930 0.936
2002 0.903 0.959 0.931 0.924 0.929
2003 0.908 0.929 0.916 0.914 0.917
2004 0.915 0.935 0.908 0.963 0.930
2005 0.957 0.930 0.898 0.963 0.937
Post-IMF 0.918 0.943 0.919 0.939 0.930
All-year 0.896 0.947 0.915 0.943 0.925
J Financ Serv ResTable 8 Tobit regression results on determinants of bank efficiency (1991–2005). This table presents results
on the determinants of bank efficiency using the Tobit censored regression model (Eq. 3). The dependent
variables are the calculated TE and SE scores (under the complete model, i.e., controlling for environmental
differences). The independent variables are as defined in Table 2. Adjusted R
2 taken from the GLS using the
same data set
Dependent variable Technical efficiency Scale Efficiency
Coefficient Std.Error t-statistic Coefficient Std.
Error
t-statistic
Constant 0.4651 0.0489 9.22*** 0.3686 0.0406 9.18**
Panel A: restructuring measures
Restructured 0.0079 0.0115 0.69 0.0132 0.0102 1.32
Recap −0.0168 0.0092 −1.83* −0.0105 0.0082 −1.29
Recap_Eff 0.0271 0.0100 2.71*** 0.0177 0.0089 2.02**
Reprivatized 0.0162 0.0195 1.72* 0.0150 0.0174 1.69*
M&A 0.0019 0.0083 1.23 0.0004 0.0073 0.06
M&A_Eff −0.02658 0.011304 −2.37** −0.01879 0.0099 −1.89*
Foreign 0.0012 0.0105 0.82 0.0048 0.0094 0.52
Foreign_Eff 0.0152 0.0099 1.07 0.0137 0.0087 1.09
Panel B: IMF-programs
Dur_IMF −0.051 0.020 −2.52** −0.0219 0.0141 −1.57
Post_IMF 0.0114 0.0186 0.62 0.0051 0.0166 0.32
Panel C: bank (CAMEL-based) characteristics
State −0.0003 0.0079 −0.05 0.0025 0.0069 0.82
Listed 0.0021 0.0067 1.10 0.0058 0.0060 0.98
LnAssets 0.0345 0.0020 11.37*** 0.0263 0.0018 14.99***
ETA 0.0042 0.0005 9.03*** 0.0038 0.0004 9.31***
LTA 0.0001 0.0002 0.81 0.0002 0.0001 1.47
LLRL −0.0047 0.0005 −8.62*** −0.0040 0.0005 −8.35***
TCTA −0.0001 0.0003 −0.33 −0.0006 0.0002 −0.04
CTI −0.0002 0.0001 −2.60*** −0.0018 0.0001 −0.27
NIITI 0.0058 0.0003 1.09 0.0017 0.0003 0.66
ROA 0.0019 0.0017 1.71* 0.0017 0.0016 1.13
LATA 0.0002 0.0002 0.95 0.0003 0.0002 1.46
LTD 0.0002 0.0001 2.13** 0.0001 0.0001 1.29
Panel D: country dummies
Indonesia −0.0361 0.0089 −4.34*** −0.0281 0.0079 −3.58***
Korea −0.0222 0.0104 −2.89*** 0.0004 0.0092 0.05
Philippines −0.0211 0.0102 −2.48*** −0.0304 0.0091 −3.39***
Diagnostics
Log likelihood function 1,253.70 1,630.36
LR test 660.85 654.67
Adjusted R
2 with year dummies 0.398 0.387
Without year dummies 0.375 0.371
Number of cross-sections 138





J Financ Serv Resthan the non-restructured ones. This result supports Hypothesis H2. Our finding is in line
with that reported by Williams and Nguyen (2005), who find no significant difference in the
profit efficiency of the restructured and other domestic private banks in either the short or
the long term.
To examine the performance effects of specific restructuring measures,
1 we capture the
recapitalization effect by using three dummies. We apply the first dummy, Recap, to assess
whether the recapitalized banks are efficient relative to the un-recapitalized ones over the
restructuring period (1998–2002). We use the second dummy, Recap_Eff, to evaluate a
short-term effect, i.e., we wish to determine if these banks become more efficient after
recapitalization. The third dummy, Reprivatized, assesses the short-term efficiency effect on
those banks that are initially recapitalized, but reprivatized in later years. The coefficient of
the dummy Recap is negative, and statistically significant at the 5% level for the TE. This
finding suggests that these recapitalized banks are significantly less efficient than their un-
recapitalized counterparts during the entire test period. However, bank recapitalization and
then re-privatization yield short-term efficiency gains, which is evidenced by the positive
and significant coefficients of Recap_Eff and Reprivatized.
The next restructuring measure, which involves domestic bank mergers and acquisitions,
is captured by the two binary dummies, M&A and M&A_Eff. The M&A dummy assesses
the efficiency of the banks that undergo any domestic mergers and/or acquisitions between
1998 and 2002. The M&A_Eff dummy evaluates if these banks become more efficient after
their mergers and/or acquisitions. The estimated coefficients of M&A are positive, but not
significant, for both technical and scale efficiencies. This finding suggests that the efficiency
performance of the banks that experience mergers and/or acquisitions is not significantly
different from their non-M&A counterparts. However, domestic mergers and acquisitions
experience significant short-term efficiency losses. This result could be partly due to their
unsuccessful alignments of corporate culture and management practices in the initial post-
merger period. Our finding is consistent with Shih (2003), who finds that two merging banks
weakened by the Asian financial crisis or even merging one weak into a healthier one, in
many cases results in one weaker bank. Hence, we find mixed results for Hypothesis H3.
We examine the outcome of the final restructuring measure, foreign participation, via
two dummies, Foreign and Foreign_Eff. We use the Foreign dummy to evaluate the
efficiency of the banks that undergo any foreign acquisition or participation between 1998
and 2002, and the Foreign_Eff dummy to see if these banks become more efficient after
their foreign acquisitions. The coefficients in the table suggest that banks that undergo
foreign acquisitions have no significantly higher technical and scale efficiencies compared
to those that do not. We find similar results for the short-term effect. Thus, we find only
marginal support for Hypothesis H4. These results support the observation by Williams and
Nguyen (2005), who find no evidence of “cherry-picking” by foreign banks in the East
Asian banking markets during 1990–2003. Our results also suggest that efficiency gains
associated with foreign participation might take a longer time to be realized.
During the IMF program period, the efficiency of the sample banks is significantly lower
than during the pre-IMF period, which suggests that the crisis has a negative effect on bank
efficiency. These banks are able to recover their efficiency levels in the post-IMF period,
but the difference is not significant when compared with their pre-IMF level. This result
1 We also conducted an evaluation of the efficiency performance of the closed banks prior to their closures.
The results, which are available on request, indicate that their pre-closure performance is significantly worse
than their unclosed counterparts, suggesting that the closure decisions are supported on economic grounds.
J Financ Serv Ressuggeststhat the Asianfinancialcrisis hascreated long-term negative effects.However,tothe
extent that the efficiency losses during the crisis period, i.e., during the intervention period,
are reversed and that the banking sectors regain their pre-crisis levels of efficiency, we could
argue that there is an improvement. This interpretation of the results supports Hypothesis H1.
4.3.2 Bank characteristics and efficiency
Table 8 (Panel C) provides the findings on the influences of bank-specific characteristics
(ownership, listing status, and CAMEL-based measures)
2 on efficiency. The results indicate
that there is no significant difference in efficiency between state-owned banks and domestic
private-owned ones. Banks with foreign participation have insignificantly higher technical
and scale efficiencies compared to the state-owned and other private-owned banks. This
finding confirms our earlier estimated results. We observe no significant impact of stock
exchange listing on efficiency. This could be due to the fact that market discipline might not
exert significant effects on efficiency in crisis-hit economies, especially in those countries
in which 46 of the sample banks are not listed. This finding is broadly in line with Laeven
(1999), who reports an insignificant relation between a stock market listing and efficiency
of Asian banks during the pre-crisis years.
Concerning the influence of CAMEL-based measures on efficiency, the coefficients in
Table 8 (Panel C) suggest that bank size, capitalization, earnings, and liquidity have a
significant positive effect on bank efficiency. These results confirm our earlier finding of
large banks’ superior scale efficiency. The significantly positive coefficient for capitaliza-
tion (ETA) is consistent with the argument that banks with high efficiency will have higher
profits and hence will be able to retain more earnings as capital (Carvallo and Kasman
2005). The positive coefficient for earnings (ROA) suggests that the more profitable banks
are also more efficient. The coefficient for liquidity, when measured by loans to deposits,
LTD, is significantly positive in terms of TE, indicating that higher fund utilization relative
to fund-raising is important for banks to improve efficiency. However, this lending
capability however is two-sided, since increased loans may lead to more credit risks, and to
higher nonperforming loans and higher operating costs if a good risk management system is
not in place. This result explains why other financial measures (loan loss reserves to loans,
LLRL; and cost to income, CTI) have significantly negative influences on bank efficiency.
4.3.3 Geographical location and bank efficiency
The coefficients of the country dummies in Table 8 (Panel D), show that Indonesian and
Filipino banks are significantly less efficient than Thai banks in both technical and scale
efficiencies (at the 1% level). On the other hand, we see that Korean banks are significantly
less efficient than Thai banks in technical efficiency only. This result suggests that on
average, Thai banks are the most efficient among those in the four selected countries.
When we include the year dummies (except those years that are covered by the dummy
Dur-IMF) in the regression, the adjusted R-squared statistic increases by only 2.3 in the TE
model, and by1.6 in the SE model, indicating only a marginal impact of the time trend on
efficiency (Diagnostics in Table 8). A closer look at each year-dummy shows that during
3years (1995, 1996, and 1998), a significantly negative trend prevails for bank efficiency,
suggesting a downward trend in efficiency before and during the crisis years.
2 CAMEL stands for Capital, Asset Quality, Management, Earnings, and Liquidity. This framework has been
used as a regulatory tool for banks in the United States, India, and the four countries in this study.
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In this paper we examine the effect of the IMF-supported restructuring programs on the
efficiency of banks subject to intervention. We sample 138 commercial banks from four
crisis-hit East Asian economies (Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand) and
examine the effects over the pre- and post-restructuring years. We investigate these effects by
using individual bank data and aggregating the test results across the sample and subsamples.
To obtain robust results, we use both nonparametric and regression models. First, we use
the nonparametric DEA to estimate technical and then scale efficiencies, incorporating
environmental or control variables of each country. Second, we regress these estimated
efficiency scores on four bank restructuring measures, IMF programs, and other bank-
specific variables, using the Tobit and GLS regressions.
Our main results indicate that, overall, East Asian banking efficiency improves in the
post-IMF period, but their recovery reaches only to their pre-IMF level. The restructured
banks are not significantly more efficient than their unrestructured counterparts, and
different restructuring measures have significantly different effects on bank efficiency. Bank
recapitalization (and then reprivatization in certain cases) yields significant short-term
efficiency gains. Mergers and acquisitions, on the other hand, experience significant short-
term efficiency losses. There are positive but insignificant effects of foreign participation on
efficiency, which suggests that the potential benefits of foreign ownership, may accrue over
a longer time than we can test here.
This paper may suggest some policy implications. Bank restructuring during a financial
crisis is required and justified on efficiency restoration grounds; but importantly, well-
designed measures are vital to ensure its success. Regulators must scrutinize bank mergers
and acquisitions as they might have only long-term implications. The normal gains in
mergers are absent in the tested period in East Asia. Recapitalization and reprivatization are
supported as a means for performance improvement. Foreign participation should be
encouraged, although its potential benefits may also take longer time to be fully realized. To
reap these benefits, regulators should pursue stronger economic reforms, especially
regarding competition, in crisis-hit countries.
Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank the participants of the FMA (Asia) Conference
(Auckland, 2006) for their very useful comments and suggestions. Many thanks also go to the anonymous
reviewers and editor of the JFSR for their great comments, which have significantly contributed to improving
the quality of this paper, and to Sandra Sizer for her excellent editing. Luc Can gratefully acknowledges the
financial support from the Australia–Asia Award during the research of this paper; part of which was drawn
from his Doctoral dissertation completed at Monash University, Australia.
References
Alper A, Onis Z (2002) Emerging market crises and the IMF: rethinking the role of the IMF in the light of
Turkey’s 2000–2001 financial crises. METU Int. Conference VI, September, Ankara, Turkey
Amel D, Barnes C, Panetta F, Salleo C (2004) Consolidation and efficiency in the financial sector: A review
of the international evidence. J Bank Finance 28:2493–2519. doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2003.10.013
Ataullah A, Cockerill T, Le H (2004) Financial liberalization and bank efficiency: a comparative analysis of
India and Pakistan. Appl Econ 36(17):1915–1924. doi:10.1080/000368404200068638
Avkiran NK (2002) Productivity analysis in the service sector with data envelopment analysis. Avkiran,
Camira
J Financ Serv ResBaltagi BH (2005) Econometric analysis of panel data. Wiley, Hoboken (NJ)
Berger AN (2007) International comparisons of banking Efficiency. Financ Markets Inst Instrum 16(3):119–
144. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0416.2007.00121.x
Berger AN, DeYoung R (1997) Problem loans and cost efficiency in commercial banks. J Bank Finance
21:849–870. doi:10.1016/S0378-4266(97)00003-4
Berger AN, Humphrey DB (1992a) Megamergers in banking and the use of cost efficiency as an antitrust
defence. Antitrust Bull 37:541–600
Berger AN, Demsetz RS, Strahan PE (1999) The consolidation of the financial services industry: causes,
consequences, and implications for the future. J Bank Finance 23:135–194. doi:10.1016/S0378-4266(98)
00125-3
Berger AN, Clarke GRG, Cull R, Klapper L, Udell GF (2005) Corporate governance and bank performance:
A joint analysis of the static, selection, and dynamic effects of domestic, foreign, and state ownership. J
Bank Finance 29(8–9):2179–2221. doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2005.03.013
Bonaccorsi di Patti E, Hardy DC (2005) Financial sector liberalization, bank privatization, and efficiency:
Evidence from Pakistan. J Bank Finance 29:2381–2406. doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2005.03.019
Bongini P, Claessens S, Ferri G (2001) The political economy of distress in East Asian financial institutions.
J Finan Serv Res 19:5–25
Brown K, Skully M (2006) Evaluating cost performance of banks in the Asia Pacific. Econ Pap 25:61–70
December Special Issue
Caprio G, Klingebiel D (2003) Episodes of systemic and borderline financial crises. World Bank financial
crises database
Carbo-ValverdeS,HumphreyDB,LopezdelPR(2007)Docrosscountrydifferencesinbankefficiencysupporta
policy of ‘national champions’. J Bank Finance 31(7):2173–2188. doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2006.09.003
Carvallo O, Kasman A (2005) Cost efficiency in the Latin American and Caribbean banking systems. J Int
Financ Mar, Inst and Mon 15(1):55–72
Casu B, Girardone C, Molyneux P (2004) Productivity change in European banking: a comparison of parametric
and non-parametric approaches. J Bank Finance 28:2521–2540. doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2003.10.014
Cebenoyan AS, Cooperman ES, Register CA, Hudgins SC (1993) The relative efficiency of stock versus
mutual S&Ls: a stochastic frontier approach. J Financ Serv Res 7:151–170. doi:10.1007/BF01046903
Chaffai ME, Dietsch M, Lozano-Vivas A (2001) Technological and environmental differences in the
European banking industries. J Financ Serv Res 19:147–162. doi:10.1023/A:1011107404524
Cheung MT, Liao Z (2005) Recapitalization of Thailand’s banks after the 1997 crisis: Interpretation and
critique from a neo-institutional perspective. Asia Pac Bus Rev 11:411–427. doi:10.1080/
13602380500068375
Choi S, Hasan I (2005) Ownership, governance, and bank performance: Korean experience. Financ Mark
Inst Instrum 14(4):215–242. doi:10.1111/j.0963-8008.2005.00104.x
Claessens S, Demirguc-Kunt A, Huizinga H (2001) How does foreign entry affect domestic banking
markets? J Bank Finance 25(5):891–911. doi:10.1016/S0378-4266(00)00102-3
Clarke GRG, Cull R, Shirley MM (2005) Bank privatization in developing countries: a summary of lessons
and findings. J Bank Finance 29(8–9):1905–1930. doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2005.03.006
Coelli TJ (1996b) A guide to DEAP version 2.1: a data Envelopment analysis (computer) program”. CEPA
Working Papers No. 7/96, University of New England, Armidale
Coelli TJ, Prasada Rao DS, O’Donnell CJ, Battese GE (2005) An introduction to efficiency and productivity
analysis, 2nd edn. Springer, New York
Cooper WW, Seiford LM, Tone K (2000) Data envelopment analysis: a comprehensive text with models,
applications, references and DEA-Solver software. Kluwer Academic, Boston
Dell’Ariccia G, Detragiache E, Rajan R (2005) The real effect of banking crises. IMF working paper no. WP/
05/63
Demirgüç-Kunt A, Detagiache E (1998) The determinants of banking crises in developing and developed
countries. IMF Staff Pap 45(1):81–120
Demirgüç-Kunt A, Detragiache E (2005) Cross-country empirical studies of systemic bank distress: a survey.
World Bank working paper no. 2143
Dietsch M, Lozano-Vivas A (2000) How the environment determines the efficiency of banks: a comparison
between French and Spanish banking industry. J Bank Finance 24:985–1004. doi:10.1016/S0378-4266
(99)00115-6
Favero CA, Papi L (1995) Technical efficiency and scale efficiency in the Italian banking sector: a non-
parametric approach. Appl Econ 27(4):385–395. doi:10.1080/00036849500000123
Fries S, Taci A (2005) Cost efficiency of banks in transition: evidence from 289 banks in 15 post communist
countries. J Bank Finance 29:55–81. doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2004.06.016
J Financ Serv ResHarada K (2005) Measuring the efficiency of banks: successful mergers in the Korean banking sector.
CNAEC research series no. 05–03
Harada K, Ito T (2005) Rebuilding the Indonesian banking sector: economic analysis of bank consolidation
and efficiency. JBICI Rev 12:32–60
Hartman TE, Storbeck JE, Byrnes P (2001) Allocative efficiency in branch banking. Eur J Oper Res
134:232–242. doi:10.1016/S0377-2217(00)00257-5
Hughes A, Yaisawarng S (2004) Sensitivity and dimensionality tests of DEA efficiency scores. Eur J Oper
Res 154:410–422. doi:10.1016/S0377-2217(03)00178-4
Isik I, Hassan MK (2003) Financial disruption and bank productivity: the 1994 experience of Turkish banks.
Q Rev Econ Finance 43(2):291–320. doi:10.1016/S1062-9769(02)00194-1
Joyce JP (2004) Adoption, implementation and impact of IMF programs: a review of the issues and
evidence. Comp Econ Stud 46:451–467. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ces.8100052
Kaminsky GL, Reinhart CM (1998) Financial crises in Asia and Latin America: then and now. Am Econ Rev
88(2):444–448
Karim MZA (2001) Comparative bank efficiency across selected ASEAN countries. ASEAN Econ Bull
18:289–304
Kasman A, Kasman SK, Carvallo O (2005) Efficiency and foreign ownership in banking: an international
comparison. Discussion paper series, Dokuz Eylül University
Laeven L (1999) Risk and Efficiency in East Asian banks. World Bank working paper no. 2255 (December)
Leightner J, Lovell CAK (1998) The impact of financial liberalization on the performance of Thai banks. J
Econ Bus 50(2):115–131. doi:10.1016/S0148-6195(97)00073-8
Lozano-Vivas A, Pastor JT, Pastor JM (2002) An efficiency comparison of European banking systems
operating under different environmental conditions. J Prod Anal 18:59–77. doi:10.1023/A:1015704510270
Megginson WL (2005) The economics of bank privatization. J Bank Finance 29(8–9):1931–1980.
doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2005.03.005
Park K, Weber WL (2006) A note on efficiency and productivity growth in the Korean banking industry,
1992–2002. J Bank Finance 30(8):2371–2386. doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2005.09.013
Psiouras F (2008) International evidence on the impact of regulations and supervision on banks’ technical
efficiency: an application of two-stage data envelopment analysis. Rev Quant Financ Account 30:187–
223
Sealey C, Lindley JT (1977) Inputs, outputs and a theory of production and cost at depository financial
institution. J Finance 32:1251–1266. doi:10.2307/2326527
Sen H (1998) The impact of the IMF-supported stabilization programs on inflation in developing countries:
the experience of Turkey in last decade. J Econ Admin Sci 12(1–2):81–98
Sheng A (1996) Bank restructuring: lessons from the 1980s. World Bank, Washington DC
Shih SHM (2003) An investigation into the use of mergers as a solution for the Asian banking sector crisis. Q
Rev Econ Finance 43:31–49. doi:10.1016/S1062-9769(01)00135-1
Tang H, Zoli E, Klytchnikova I (2000) Banking crises in transition economies: Fiscal costs and related
issues. World Bank policy research working paper No.2484
Weill L (2003) Banking efficiency in transition economies: the role of foreign ownership. Econ Transit
11:569–592. doi:10.1111/1468-0351.00155
White H (1980) Nonlinear regression on cross-section data. Econometrica 48(3):721–746
Williams J, Nguyen N (2005) Financial liberalization, crisis and restructuring: a comparative study of bank
performance and bank governance in South East Asia. J Bank Financ 29:2119–2154
Zhu J (2003) Quantitative models for performance evaluation and benchmarking: data envelopment analysis
with Spreadsheets and DEA Excel Solver. Kluwer Academic, Massachusetts
J Financ Serv Res